Indian Divorce in U.S. Courts

Many Indian nationals had their marriage in India and domicile in the United States. They travel back to India for the purpose of obtaining divorce certificates. The issue of jurisdiction becomes important factor for the recognition of their foreign divorce judgments in the United States. This article analyzes this issue.

In most circumstances, a judgment of divorce of a foreign national court has no independent force outside the forum’s territory. Thus courts will enforce their own judgments within their own national boundary.

As a general rule, a judgment of a court of one nation may be recognized and enforced in another nation if the courts of that nation are willing to accept the decree of the nation where the judgment was issued.

Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments occur when a U.S. court relies upon foreign divorce ruling, on the ground that it has been previously litigated abroad. Thus recognition of foreign divorce judgments is akin to the domestic U.S. doctrines of res judicat (or claim preclusion, prevents parties of a claim from re-litigating the same claim), and collateral estoppel (or preclusion which extends the preclusive effort of a judgment to re-litigation of issues that were decided in a prior action.) The enforcement of foreign divorce judgment is typically sought by a plaintiff who has obtained a judgment in a foreign country.

In the United States, the judgments of one state’s court are routinely enforced in another state. Article IV, Sec. 1 of the U.S. Constitution requires that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other state.” Congress has implemented the full faith and credit clause by statutory enactment providing that judicial proceedings “shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States…as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State…from which they are taken.” (28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738. 1982).

The Doctrine of Comity

Presently, in the United States, there is no federal standard governing the enforcement of divorce judgments rendered by foreign courts. Unlike state judgments, foreign judgments are not covered by the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution and other statutes. Nor are there any federal statutes to enforce foreign divorce judgments in U.S. courts. The United States is not party to any international agreement regarding the mutual recognition of divorce judgments.

With the absence of a treaty or statute upon this subject, the duty rests upon the judicial tribunals to determine the rights of the parties in divorce suits brought before them. In doing this, the courts obtain such aid for their judicial decision, from the works of jurists, commentators and academic scholars, and from the acts of civilized nations. Thus U.S. courts may give recognition to the judgments of a foreign nation as a matter of “comity.”

The “doctrine of comity,” in the legal sense, is not an absolute obligation; it is a courtesy, where the court may recognize a foreign court order, but is not compelled to do so. This extension or denial of comity is discretionary to the U.S. court

Indian nationals domiciled in the United States, initiate divorce in India. Many of them have dual US-Indian nationalities. They travel to India for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce judgments from Indian courts. Then they travel back to the United States and serve the other spouses with divorce papers. Do the U.S. courts extend comity and recognize the enforceability of those divorce judgments? Or do the U.S. courts assert their own jurisdiction on the divorce cases? The key concepts in this “conflict of law” in the United States are two: subject matter jurisdiction (or competence), and personal jurisdiction.

For a foreign court to have authority to adjudicate a dispute involving divorce, it must have jurisdiction over divorce issues. A divorce can be granted only in a court designated to hear matrimonial cases. It is well settled that U.S. courts will not enforce foreign judgments unless foreign courts possessed “competence” or subject matter jurisdiction under foreign law. Consequently, lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a basis for non-recognition.

Personal jurisdiction, known also as “personam” is the power of a court “to hear and determine a lawsuit involving a defendant by virtue of the defendant having some contact with the place where the court is located.” (See http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionay.com/Personal-Jurisdiction). Personal jurisdiction is a basic pre-requisite for the enforcement of a foreign judgment. The foreign court issuing the judgment must possess personal jurisdiction and authority over persons within its territory. This includes: domiciliary, citizenship, place of marriage, etc.

U.S. courts generally, are able to decide divorce cases based on at least one of the spouses being domiciled or maintaining a habitual residence within the geographic jurisdiction of the court. Domicile is defined as physical presence and an intention to live permanently in a location. Such intentions are determined by where a person is registered to vote, filing state tax return, state issued driving license, which school the children go to, does he or she join a gym in the area of residence and where the home is located, etc.

Divorce cases involving multinational jurisdictions are complex. Foreign divorces may involve immigration matters, child custody, division of marital assets and support orders, which have their own specialized enforcement issues. In most cases attorneys and litigants consult with experts in foreign laws before determination.

Gabriel Sawma is Professor of Middle Constitutional Law, Islamic Shari’a, and Arabic. He is considered an authority on Private International Law involving foreign divorce issues, Islamic banking and finance. Admitted to the Lebanese Bar Association in 1970; Associate Member of the New York State Bar and American Bar Associations. Editor of International Law Website: http://www.gabrielsawma.blogspot.com

Email: gabrielsawma@yahoo.com

Islamic Divorce in U.S. Courts

Islamic Divorce Obtained in a Foreign Country

U.S. Courts do not apply Islamic Shari'a law because it violates the Establishment Clause set in the United States Constitution; American Courts do apply foreign law in certain cases involving international principle known as "conflict of Laws," or "Private International Law." This is referred to in U.S. courts as the "doctrine of comity".

In the area of Private International Law, Comity is a courtesy, amity, and reciprocity by U.S. courts towards court decision issued in other nations. Such a consideration by U.S. courts does not entail an obligation to agree with the rulings of foreign judgments. There is therefore a distinction between the doctrine of comity and law.

Public International Law can become part of the national law when the country has its signature on that law, Private international Law, however, does not have the same level of recognition by U.S. Courts. The issue of comity is raised in Islamic divorce cases when a person who resides legally in the United States travels to a foreign country and obtain a certificate of divorce from a religious court.

The intent is to obtain an instant divorce by pronouncing triple talaq (divorcing his wife three times in a few minutes.) Such an action leaves the wife with nothing more than a nominal deferred mahr, and takes advantage of the child custody, which discriminates against the women and to label the wife as bad Muslim.

The man then returns to the United States and serves his wife with divorce papers demanding the implementation of the divorce according to the Islamic Shari'a, claiming that the "doctrine of comity" applies to his case.

American courts do not apply Islamic laws because it violates the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution; they apply foreign law at their discretion. To determine whether to apply a foreign law, U.S. courts turn to Private International Law, including the “doctrine of comity.” Thus the application of the principle of comity is not mandatory, but is rather a matter of custom. They may deny the application of comity if the judges deem the foreign laws is “repugnant” to U.S. principle of law.

Generally, a judgment of divorce for example issued in a foreign country is recognized in the U.S. on the basis of comity, provided both parties to the divorce received adequate notice, i.e. service of process and, generally, provided one of the parties has a domicile in the foreign nation at the time of divorce, and the foreign court has given opportunity to both parties to present their case, and the trial was conducted upon regular proceedings after due citation or voluntary appearance of the litigants, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country, and those of other countries, an no prejudice towards either party and should not violate a strong U.S. principle of law, and the parties were present in court.

An Islamic triple talaq differs substantially with respect to property division. Under Islamic Shari’a, wives may be entitled to a deferred mahr, which is, in most cases, much less than what U.S. courts order; above all, U.S. courts will not accept an Islamic divorce certificate obtained in a foreign country if the cause of action on which the divorce is based is “repugnant” to the public policy of the State in which the case is litigated.

Gabriel Sawma is Professor of Middle East Constitutional Law and Islamic Shari’a. He is an expert on Islamic marriage contracts and Islamic divorce. Editor of an International Law website: http://www.gabrielsawma.blogspot.com. Author of “The Qur’an: Misinterpreted, Mistranslated and Misread. The Aramaic Language of the Qur’an.” http://www.syriacaramaicquran.com. Author of an upcoming book on Islamic Divorce in US Courts. Email: gabrielsawma@yahoo.com; gabygms@gmail.com; tel. (609) 915-2237.

the Islamic marriage contract

In Islam, marriage is a contract, called nikah. In Syriac Aramaic, nkah means [to treat courteously]. Muslim interpreters of the Quran difine the purpose of nikah as a right given to the husband to enjoy the body of the woman [istimta]. The man owns the contract of marriage. The Hanafi school of thought defines the nikah as a contract according to which “the man owns the right to enjoy the body of the woman” (haqq al istimtaa’). to this school of thought, the man alone has the right to enjoy the body of the woman.

The Shafi’i school of thought gives the man the “right to enjoy the known pleasure” [alladha al ma’roufah] with his wife. The Maliki and Hanbali schools agree with the definition given by the hanafi.

Istimta’ (the right to enjoy the woman’s body) is given to the man, but how about the woman. Does she have a similar right? Can she claim that she has the same right as her husband for enjoying his body? On this issue the madhahib give the following interpretations:

According to the Shafi’i, the woman enjoys the same rights as her husband. The Hanafi differs on this, this school argues that the istimta’ (the right to enjoy woman’s body) belongs to the man alone; it does not include the woman. In other words, the man can force his wife to grant him the right to enjoy her body, but she is denied that. The Four Schools agree that the man can order his wife to fulfill istimta’ unless there is a valid excuse.

The Four madhahib (schools of thought) state unanimously that the marriage contract must be drawn according to the Islamic Shari’a:

1. The marriage contract must be between a man and a woman;
2. It is illegal to have a marriage contract between a man and another man, or a woman with another woman;
   
3. It is also illegal to have a marriage contract between a Muslim man and a pagan woman unless she converts to Islam. A Muslim man may marry Christian or Jewish woman. But a Muslim woman is not allowed to marry a non-Muslim man.
4. It is illegal to have a marriage contract between a Muslim man and Muslim woman if she is among the class of people who are not lawful to him in marriage, these include: mother, daughter, sister, aunt, niece, woman who breast-fed the man, mother-in-law, step-daughters;
5. It is forbidden to marry two sisters;
6. The Quran allows Muslim men to marry women from a list prescribed in 33: 51.
7. The contract must be accepted by both parties ijab (offer to marry) and qubul (accept of the offer), and witnessed be two men; in the presence of the wali (a guardian for the woman).
   
8. The mut’a marriage (known as a marriage for pleasure, for a specific period of time) is forbidden in the four madhahib according to the Sunni traditions, but this kind is considered legal for the Shi’a.
9. Payment of mahr to the bride by the husband must be included in the contract. While marriage in Islam is not regarded as a sacrament, as it is in the Christian tradition, the Islmaic marriage contract is regarded an act of faith and is addressed in various verses of the Quran. See 16: 73, and 30: 22
   

In modern days, a marriage contract is done in the presence of an imam (religious leader) or a trusted Muslim man, who understands the law of Islam. It also requires a full consent of the couple by expressing ijab (offer) and qubul (acceptance) in front of two reliable witnesses. One of the important stipulations in modern marriages in Islam is the mahr (the bridal money) ,which has to be paid before the marriage or after the marriage has been consummated. Another important condition for a marriage is the ishhar (public announcement), which means the marriage has to be publicized so that people do not raise questions about the relationship.

The Quran forbids Muslim men to marry pagan women (non-Christians and non-Jews) unless they convert to Islam.

According to the Islamic Shari’a, a marriage to an idolatress is considered illegal, unless she converts. According to a recent fatwa, a Muslim marriage to a communist is illegal.

It is illegal also to marry a “murtaddah” (a Muslim woman who changes her religion), such a marriage is void according to the Quran. (See Quran 2: 218)

Whoever marries a murtaddah, the religious judge must nullify the marriage, and this is agreed upon by all the madhahib (schools of thought), regardless as to whether the murtadd is man or woman. According to the Islamic Shari’a, those who change Islam for another religion are subject to the death penalty, except the Hanafi madhab, who mandates prison term for the woman rather than execution.

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Gabriel Sawma, a lawyer dealing with International Law, mainly the European Union Law, the Middle East Law and Islamic Shari'a law. Professor of Middle East Constitutional Law, Islamic Shari'a, Arabic and Aramaic languages. Expert witness on Islamic marriage contracts, including the mahr; expert witness on U.S.-Middle East commercial contracts. Member of the Beirut Bar Association in Lebanon; The New York State Bar Association; Associate member of the American Bar Association. Author of an upcoming book on "Islamic marriage Contracts in U.S. Courts and the Mahr." Author of an upcoming book on conflicts in U.S. Middle East Commercial Contracts. Editor of International Law website: http://www.gabrielsawma.blogspot.com, Email: gabrielsawma@yahoo.com

Application of Islamic Shari’a in US Courts

In 2004 a crash of Blackwater Flight 61 occurred in the rugged mountains of central Afghanistan, killing three soldiers and three-man crew. The widows of the soldiers sued Presidential Airways, Blackwater’s sister company, which was under contract with the U.S. military to fly cargo and personnel around Afghanistan.

Lawyers for the company has asked a federal court to decide the case using provisions from the Islamic Shari’a, not the U.S. laws. They argue that the Shari’a “does not hold a company responsible for the actions of employees performed within the course of their work.” http://www.newsobserver.com/917/story/1113022.html

The Vicarious Liability

In the American legal system the term ‘vicarious liability’ is used to indicate the responsibility of the employer for the acts of his employee provided that the employee is doing his job within the scope of his employment. Thus if a driver of a company car hits someone on the road, during the course of his employment, he and the company may be liable for the damages. To establish the employee's conduct was within the scope of employment, certain conditions must be met, these are: (1) the conduct must have occurred substantially within the time and space limits authorized by the employment; (2) the employee must have been motivated, at least partially, by a purpose to serve the employer; and (3) the act must have been of a kind that the employee was hired to perform. In this example, if the driver is driving the same car to see his girlfriend without authorization of his employer and an accident occurs during this trip, he alone, not the employer may be responsible for the accident.

In the Islamic Shari’a (law), the closest example that may shed light on this subject is the mutual help in relation to the custom of blood money (diyya) under the Arab tribal custom. This is a compensation paid to the heirs of a victim of murder.

According to Islamic Shari’a, the penalty applied for causing death to someone is based on the principle of an eye for an eye and a nose for a nose. However, the hadith, a second source of shari’a, allows the payment of diyya in terms of cash to the heirs of the victim, regardless as to whether the crime was pre-meditated or not.

In the majority of cases, when the person cannot afford to pay the diyya, his family and clan come up with the money accepted by the family of the victim. This tradition, which has been in existence before the rise of Islam, has been endorsed by the four Islamic schools of thought in the Sunni sect of Islam: Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanafi and Hanbali.

The principle of compensation and group responsibility was accepted by the Prophet of Islam. The system of collective responsibility was practiced in Medina in what is known as "The Constitution of The Medina". It occurred after the Hijra (the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina in 622) and was recorded by the biographer of the Prohet, Ibn Ishaq, who authored the first book on the life of Muhammad; his book is titled: "Al-Sira al-Nabawiyya".

The amount of diyya in the Sunni traditions depends on the gender and religion of the victim. According to the Shafi’i and Hanafi schools, the family of a murdered Muslim woman gets half the diyya given to the family of a murdered Muslim man. If the murdered person is Jew or Christian, the family gets 1/3 of the amount given to the family of a murdered Muslim man according to the Shafi’i school. The Maliki states that the families of a murdered woman, or murdered Jew or murdered Christian, get half of the diyya paid to the family of a murdered Muslim man. The Hanbali differentiate between pre-meditated and un-premeditated murder. If the killing is pre-meditated committed by a Muslim against Christian or Jew, the families of the victims get a diyya equivalent to that given to the family of a Muslim victim; but if the killing of Christian or Jew by a Muslim is un-premeditated, then the families get half of the diyya given to a Muslim family.

In Islamic countries, the vicarious liability applies to the insurance company to pay for the damages incurred to the insured. Insurance is regarded as a system of mutual help in relation to the custom of blood money that is practiced in the Muslim world.

Jurisdiction and Application of Law

As far as the jurisdiction of US courts is concerned, the following principles have to be taken into consideration: (1) American courts do not recognize the Islamic law; judging a case in an American court on a religious law is unconstitutional. The courts do recognize however the law that is tied to specific nation, such as the laws of Saudi Arabia and Iran; American judges make every effort to understand how the principles of Islamic Shari’a relate to the law of the nations involved in the case. (2) To have a better understanding of the Islamic Shari’a, the judges usually hold evidentiary hearing eliciting expert testimony from both sides.

In this case, the legal team for the defendant requests the Federal Court in Florida to apply the Islamic law of Afghanistan. They argue the lawsuit “is governed by the law of Afghanistan…”

Lawyers familiar with Middle East legal systems know that Islamic Shari’a is applied in matters related to marriage, divorce, inheritance and custody of children. Even countries which adhere strictly to Islamic law, have modernized their civil codes.

Afghanistan adheres strictly to the Hanafi madhab (school of thought in Sunni Islam), its 1976 Civil Law does not require the application of Islamic shari’a in a matter like this; to the contrary, the Civil Law of Afghanistan asserts that the obligations stemming from contracts “must adhere to the laws of the state where the contract was signed”. Article 27 reads the following:

"in regard to obligations arising from contracts, the law of the state where parties to the contract reside, shall be applicable, in case they do not reside in the same country, the law of the state where the contract is completed, shall be applicable provided the parties to the contract have not agreed on application of specific law, or evidence do not point to the fact that the parties to the contract did not think of application of another law.”

As to the conditions related to the "form of contracts", article 28 of the Civil Law states the following:

"Provisions of the law of the state where the contract is completed shall be applicable.”

Subsequently, if the contract was signed in the United States, then it is obvious that that jurisdiction is here in the US and US laws are applicable.

Gabriel Sawma, a lawyer dealing with International Law, mainly the European Union Law, the Middle East Law and Islamic Shari'a law. Professor of Middle East Constitutional Law, Islamic Shari'a, Arabic and Aramaic languages. Expert witness on Islamic marriage contracts, including the mahr; expert witness on U.S.-Middle East commercial contracts. Member of the Beirut Bar Association in Lebanon; The New York State Bar Association; Associate member of the American Bar Association. Author of an upcoming book on "Islamic marriage Contracts in U.S. Courts and the Mahr." Author of an upcoming book on conflicts in U.S. Middle East Commercial Contracts. Editor of International Law website: http://www.gabrielsawma.blogspot.com, Email: gabrielsawma@yahoo.com

http://gabrielsawma.blogspot.com

The Shebaa Farms Under International Law

By

Gabriel Sawma Esq.


Background

Following World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the territories of Lebanon and Syria, which were considered one single political unit prior to the War, were mandated by the League of Nations to France. The principle underlying the Mandate was expressed in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Mandate proceeded until November 26, 1941, when General Georges Catroux, de Gaule’s choice for governing the mandated territory, proclaimed in the name of his government and its ally the termination of the mandate and the establishment of “sovereignty and independence” of Lebanon and Syria. Lebanon became a constitutional republic in 1943.

The internationally recognized borders between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria are governed by the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Those agreements ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and established the armistice lines between Israel and the West Bank, also known as the Green Line, until the 1967 Six-Day War between the Arab States of Jordan, Egypt and Syria on one side and Israel on the other side.

The Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon was signed on March 23, 1949. It points the following

• The Armistice Line (“The Blue Line”) was drawn along the international border.
• The international border between Lebanon and Israel are considered to be a de jure international border (i.e. by law).
• Israel withdrew its forces from 13 villages in Lebanese territory, which were occupied during the war.

With the exception of the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement, the other agreements were clear (at Arab insistence) that they were not creating a permanent or du jure borders.


The Israeli-Syrian Invasion of Lebanon

On March 15, 1978, Israel launched a major military incursion into South Lebanon, called the Litani River Operation, and struck at PLO bases and staging areas south of the Litani River, up to 10 kilometers deep inside the country. The operation prompted a formal statement of “United States Concern with the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon,” calling for Israeli withdrawal and discussing a United Nations role in Lebanon. On March 19, 1978, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 425 calling for Israeli withdrawal and establishing an international peace-keeping force for South Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), to enable establishing of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon free of PLO bases.

By June, 1978, Prime Minister Begin, under intense American pressure, withdrew Israeli forces, which were replaced by UNIFIL. The withdrawal of Israeli troops without having removed the PLO from its bases in southern Lebanon became a major embarrassment to the Begin government. The cross-border cycle of attack and retaliation continued, and the PLO expanded its bases, forces, and armaments in Lebanon. Finally, Israel responded with its 1982 invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon. The UNIFIL force is still deployed in 2006.

UNIFIL was unable to prevent terrorists from infiltrating the region. Cross-border conflict between Israel and various forces in southern Lebanon continued to intensify. Civilians on both sides, and UNIFIL peacekeepers, were killed as the fighting continued to escalate, and Palestinians were shelling the northern Israel. In June 3, 1982, the Defense Minister Ariel Sharon ordered the invasion of Lebanon with a massive force in an operation called Peace for the Galilee. Israeli forces drove all the way to Beirut. The PLO’s leadership was forced to move to Tunis. This military operation, although planned for limited duration, became bogged down and continued far longer than expected. The army lost 650 soldiers. For three years the Israel Defense Force (IDF) remained deep in Lebanon, until it withdrew, in 1985, to the international border. Some territory in south Lebanon was retained as a security zone. The area was monitored jointly by Israeli Army (IDF) and its Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) ally.

The Lebanese Civil War, which started in April, 1975, provided the pretext for Syrian Military intervention in Lebanon. Alleging the fear of a Christian-Muslim partition of the country and/or a PLO takeover, Hafez Assad of Syria sent, on June 1, 1976, 12,000 regular Syrian troops to Lebanon. By September of that year the number reached approximately 25,000 men. The Syrian force was operating under what came to be known as the Arab Deterrent Force authorized by the Riyadh Summit held in October 1976. Syrian troops acted to disarm some Lebanese militias at the same time that the national army of Lebanon disintegrated. By 1977, the number of Syrian troops exceeded 30,000, with over 200 tanks. On October 13, 1990, Syrian forces captured the presidential palace at Ba’abda, southeast of Beirut, and defeated the Lebanese Army units, which were under the command of General Michel Aoun, who declared ‘a war of liberation” against Syria. Syrian military occupation of Lebanon incorporated the entire country with the exception of southern Lebanon, which was under the control of the Israeli Army and the Southern Lebanese Army.

On May 23, 2000, the Israeli military carried out a unilateral withdrawal from the south and the Bekaa Valley, ending 22 years of occupation causing the collapse of the 6,000 SLA members. With the withdrawal of Israeli forces, many Lebanese began calling for a review of the continued Syrian presence in their country.

On June 16, 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted the report of the Secretary General verifying Israel’s compliance with UNSCR 425 and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to their side of the demarcated Lebanese-Israeli line of separation (The “Blue Line”) mapped out by UN cartographers. In August, 2000, with the permission of Syria, the Lebanese Government ordered the deployment of 500 police and 500 soldiers to areas of south Lebanon evacuated by the Israelis. This force was not allowed to disarm Hizbullah guerrillas or to take up positions along the blue lines. Hizbullah maintained observation posts and conducted patrols along the Blue Line.

In the summer of 2004, Syria pressured the country’s cabinet into endorsing a constitutional change designed to let President Emile Lahoud extend his expiring six-year term for three more years. Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had for years been a fierce foe of Mr. Lahoud and had strongly opposed amending the Constitution. But suddenly he changed his mind after a night meeting with the Syrian chief of military intelligence.

On September 2, 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, coauthored by France and the United States. The Resolution “calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon” and “for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.” Syria made few moves to comply with the Resolution until the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, on February 14, 2005. International pressure and mass demonstrations that were labeled ‘the Cedar Revolution’ prompted President Bashar Assad of Syria to announce on March 5, 2005, his plan to “bring his forces home.” On April 26, 2005, after 29 years of occupation of Lebanon, the last Syrian troops left the country


The Shebaa Farms Issue

Shortly after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, dispatched his special Middle East envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen, and a team of experts to meet with Israeli and Lebanese officials and verify that both sides were in agreement on the conditions required by Resolution 425. The UN team reported that the Lebanese Government “informed the United Nations of its new position regarding the definition of its territory.” The claim included that Israeli forces seized a piece of Lebanese territory during the Six-Day War, called Shebaa Farms, located on the western slopes of Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights, and has been occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War with Syria, Egypt, and Jordan.

The Farms are presumed to be owned by the residents of the nearby Lebanese town of Shebaa. Before the Six-Day War, most Shebaa landowners and farmers lived in a Lebanese village of Shebaa. The Shebaa farms, a separate piece of territory, about 14 kilometers (8.7 mi) in length, and averages 2.5 kilometers (1.6 mi) in width, lie inside Syria. The farmers used to cross the land from Shebaa city in Lebanon to the Shebaa Farms in Syria. Its fertile, well-watered farmland formerly produced barley, fruits, and vegetable for 14 farms, but now desolate.

After Syria lost the land in 1967, the Lebanese farmers of the city of Shebaa were no longer able to commute and to farm the land at Shebaa Farms. Israel maintains that the Shebaa Farms was officially part of Syria when Israel occupied the region. Syria and Lebanon claim that the territory is in fact part of Lebanon, since Lebanon did not play a role in the Six-Day War, they claim, Israel must evacuate the territory in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions.

It is worth to mention here, that the 1949 Armistice Demarcation Treaty between Lebanon and Israel followed the pattern of demarcation that was instituted by Great Britain and France in 1923. Nevertheless, there was no official border between the two countries. “On maps, the French clearly marked Shebaa Farms as Syrian territory, while marking the village of Shebaa, whose residents owned the farms, as the territory of Lebanon.” In other words, the town of Shebaa is considered to be a Lebanese territory, while the Shebaa Farms is Syrian land.

During the 1950s and early 60s A joint Lebanese Syrian commission was formed to determine the border between the two nations. In 1964 the commission determined that the Farms belong officially to Lebanon. However, maps printed after 1964 did not incorporate the determination of the commission, the maps printer after that period rather shows that the Shebaa Farms are still Syrian territory. And in 1960, Syrian authority ordered the inhabitants of the Shebaa Farms to replace their Lebanese identification cards with Syrian ones.

The Lebanese government showed little interest in the views of the inhabitants. While the commission was conduction its work to determine the border identity, the Syrian Government maintained control over the Farms. In 1955, the Syrian military built an outpost on one of the farms, and military bases in the area.

Those military posts in and around the Farms confirmed the identity of the Shebaa Farms as Syrians. During the Israeli invasion of Syria in 1967, the territory was captured by the Israeli forces and remained occupied until this time. No Lebanese or Syrian newspapers or any other discussion about the identity of the Shabaa Farms as being Lebanese territory, nor was there any hint in the UN Security Council at the time by the Lebanese representative to this effect. At no time, prior to the Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, did the Lebanese Government claim the Shebaa Farms to be Lebanese.

In 1974, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established at Camp Faouar in Syria. Its mandate includes: (1) to supervise the cease-fire between Israel and Syria; (2) to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces; and (3) to supervise the Areas of Separation and Limitation, as provided in the Agreement of Disengagement between Israel and Syrian forces of May 31, 1974. The UNDOF maintained the border with the Shebaa Farms as part of Syria.

In March 19, 1978, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 426 establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) headquartered in Naqura, Southern Lebanon to oversee the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon. The Lebanese Government made no attempt to claim the Shebaa Farms.

On May 4, 2000, three weeks after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Lebanon in compliance with Security Council Resolution 425 and 426, 1978, the Lebanese Government officially filed a grievance with Israel to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. He called the Lebanese move a “new position”. Lebanese officials claim, without giving an explanation, that in 1951, Syria had given the Shebaa Farms to Lebanon. They claim also that there is no record to such a transfer at the United Nations. In fact one senior Lebanese official stated that the Syrian transfer of Shebaa Farms to Lebanon occurred in the form of “oral agreement” between the two countries and “nothing was documented.” In May 29, 2000, the Lebanese Newspaper, ‘The Daily Star’ described the land deed of one resident of the Shebaa Farms as “handwritten and signed on a yellow piece of paper in pencil and ink.” Furthermore, the Lebanese government presented the a forged land deed to the UN representatives date back to the 1940’s, years before the alleged transfer took place, an indication of inconsistency on the part of the Lebanese Government.

There are documents from the 1920s and 1930s that indicate some local inhabitant in the region who considered themselves to be part of Lebanon. Some have even paid taxes to the Lebanese government. But the demarcations from that period under the French mandate show that the Shebaa Farms lie within the borders of Syria. Detailed maps produced by the French in 1933, and again in 1945 point out to the same conclusion. U.S and French archives leave no doubt that the Shebaa Farms belong to Syria.

All maps belonging to the period before 1967 save one, an apparent forgery, show the land as being on the Shebaa Farms on the Syrian side of the border. In fact, on February 13, 2006, a Lebanese newspaper Beirut Times article quotes a Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt, member of the Lebanese Parliament displayed and map and revealed that it was a “fake map,” with the boundary shifted. In an interview, the Druze leader said the following: “The question of the Shebaa Farms was invented by Syria and Iran using Hizbullah as a pretense to have an armed presence in Lebanon. This must end.”

Lebanese army map published in 1961 and 1966 indicate the Shebaa Farms area, including Zebdine, Fashkoul, Mougr Shebaa, and Ramta as being part of the Syrian territory and lie inside the border of Syria. Every single Syrian map and every single Lebanese Ministry of Tourism map show the Lebanese border runs west of the Shebaa Farms. These maps make it clear that the Shebaa Farms are in fact a Syrian land.

The UN Secretary General issued the following report, disputing the claims of Lebanon on the Shebaa Farms, he states the following:

‘On 15 May 2000, the United Nations received a map, dated 1966 from the Government of Lebanon which reflected the Government’s position that these farmlands were located in Lebanon. However, the United Nations is in possession of 10 other maps issued after 1966 by various Lebanese Government institutions, including the Ministry of Defense and the army, all of which place the farmlands inside the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations has also examined six maps issued by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, including three maps since 1966, which place the farmlands inside the Syrian Arab Republic...’

Nancy Solderberg, a high-ranking official with the U.S. delegation to the UN, made a similar observation. She said: “When it was clear the Israelis were going to withdraw fully from Lebanon, Syrian and Lebanese officials fabricated the fiction that this small, sparsely populated area was part of Lebanon. They even produced a crudely fabricated map to back up the dubious claim. I and United Nations officials went into the map room in the United Nations and looked at all the maps of the region in the files for decades. All showed the Shebaa Farms clearly in Syria.

Hizbullah’s claim over Shebaa Farms

In June 18, 2000, the UN Security Council issued a statement confirming the identification of Israeli withdrawal, and noting that both sides would respect the Blue Line as identified. Moreover, the Security Council took note, “with serious concern,” of reports of violations by Hizbullah that had occurred since June 16, 2000, and called upon the parties to respect the line drawn by the United Nations.

On October 7 of that year, Hizbullah launched a daring attack into the Shebaa Farms and abducted three Israeli soldiers. In February 16, 2001, another attack was conducted by Hizbullah, it killed an Israeli soldier. In the meantime, the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Hariri was reassuring the world that there will be no more outbreaks of violence in south Lebanon. In an interview, he was quoted as saying: “We have a clear agreement with our Syrian brothers in this matter…There will be no provocations on our part.”

Hizbullah, founded in 1982 with the mission of expelling Israel from all Lebanese occupied land. The organization presents itself as being a charitable organization. It holds several seats in the Lebanese parliament, and two cabinet seats in the current Lebanese government of Prime Minister Fouad Seniora. Hizbullah is mainly funded by Iran and operates under the auspices of Syria.

The Lebanese Government allows Hizbullah’s militia to act despite Security Council Resolutions which call for all militias in Lebanon to be disbanded. In fact the Lebanese Government maintains that Hizbullah is a “national resistance group” and doe not fall under the requests of the Security Council.

Although Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in compliance with Security Council Resolution 1559, it still maintains control over Hizbullah. Syria uses the organization to force its will on Lebanon and to keep the Israeli forces engaged until such time comes when Israel ends its occupation of the Syrian territory

Hizbullah’s critics charge it with simply using the issue to justify its existence as an armed force and to continue serving as an outpost of Iran’s Islamic revolution. But would-be peacemakers say that if Israel relinquishes the area, Hizbullah will have no excuse to continue its armed role and could better be pressured to transform itself into a normal political party. This suggestion has been made by the Lebanese Prime Minster Fouad Seniora. In an interview with Aljazeera.net, the Prime Minister of Lebanon said his government “cannot force Hizbullah to disarm as long as Israel continues to occupy the Shebaa Farms.”

For Israel, the Shebaa Farms have little strategic importance and has always been subject to return to Syria in a peace negotiations. Israel might probably accept a pullback from the Farms if Syria formally ceded the area to Lebanon.

So far Syria has been supporting, verbally, Lebanon’s claim to the area, but it has shunned any official redefinition of its borders because it still regards the territory of Lebanon, Jordan and Israel to be part of the Greater Syria that existed before World War One.


The Dispute under International Law

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its prime function is to arbitrate international disputes. The court’s decisions are binding, and its broad jurisdiction encompasses cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. The court may be asked to give advisory opinions at the request of the General Assembly or the Security Council or at the request of other organs and specialized agencies authorized by the General Assembly.

Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) states the following:

“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.”

In Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute, the states may at any time “declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all disputes concerning…(b): any question of international law…”

Chapter IV, Article 65 states that “the Court may give an advisory opinion on legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.”

Accordingly, the Lebanese government may request an “advisory opinion” from the ICJ to resolve the dispute over its territorial claims over the Shebaa Farms. Syria could be called on by the ICJ to submit an affidavit supporting Lebanon’s claim to the Shebaa Farms. The United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council may submit a request to the ICJ for an “advisory opinion”. None of that has happened yet.

Since its inception, the ICJ has ruled on many cases regarding the territorial claims. The following is an example:

• In the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands), the court traced developments that had begun before the 1839 separation on the Netherlands from Belgium, and in its judgment, on June 20, 1959, it indicated that sovereignty over the disputed plots belonged to Belgium.

• On July 8, 1991, Qatar filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two States relating to “sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit’at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two States. Bahrain contested the basis of jurisdiction invoked by Qatar. Finally the Court issued its ruling on March 16, 2001.

• On December 1, 1978, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia notified the Court of a Special Agreement in the Arabic language signed at Tunis on 10 June 1977 between the Republic of Tunisia and the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The government of Tunisia requested the Court to render its judgment on the principles and rules of international law which may be applied for the delimitation of the area of continental shelf appertaining to the Republic of Tunisia and the area of the continental shelf appertaining to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

• On November 26, 1957, the ICJ issued its ruling on the case concerning right of passage over Indian Territory between Portugal and India. The Portuguese Government requested the Court to recognize and declare that Portugal was the holder or beneficiary of a right of passage between its territory of Damao and its enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli and between each of the latter and that this right comprises the faculty of transit for persons and goods, including armed forces, without restrictions or difficulties and in the manner and to the extent required by the effective exercise of Portuguese sovereignty in the said territories, that India has prevented and continues to prevent the exercise of the right in question, thus committing an offense to the detriment of Portuguese Sovereignty over the enclaves and violating its international obligations and to adjudge that India should put an immediate end to this situation by allowing Portugal to exercise the right of passage thus claimed. The application expressly referred to Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute and to the Declarations by which Portugal and India have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

• In its advisory opinion on the question put by the Security Council of the United Nations, “What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)?” On June 21, 1971, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion by stating that “the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory.”

• In a case between Libya and Chad, the two countries submitted to the Court a territorial dispute relating to the Aozou Strip in the Sahara. Libya’s claim as made in the case extended far to the south of that strip of land. The Court, in a judgment on February 3, 1994, found wholly in favor of Chad. After and agreement on the implementation of the judgment had been concluded between the two nations, Libyan forces, monitored by an observer force deployed by the Security Council, withdrew from the Aozou strip by May 31, 1994.

In the Middle East, as elsewhere in the world, there are territorial disputes including Sudan and Egypt on international boundary around the “Hala’ib Triangle,” a barren area of 20580 sq km. Libya claims about 19,400 sq klm in northern Niger and part of south-eastern Algeria. Kuwait ownership of Quruh and Umm al Maradim islands is disputed by Saudi Arabia. Iran occupies two islands in the Persian Gulf claimed by the United Arab Emirates: Lesser Tunb (called Tunb as Sughra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Kuchek in Paersian by Iran) and Greater Tunb (called Tunb al Kubra in Arabic by UAE and Jarireh-ye Tonb-e Bozorg in Persian by Iran); it jointly administers with the UAE an island in the Persian Gulf claimed by the UAE (called Abu Mussa in Arabic by the UAE and Jazireh-ye Abu Mussa in Persian by Iran)-over which Iran has taken steps to exert unilateral control since 1992, including access restrictions and a military build-up on the island; the UAE has garnered significant diplomatic support in the region in protesting these Iranian actions.

Iran and Iraq, after their eight-year war, restored diplomatic relations in 1990 but are still to settle disputes concerning border demarcation, freedom of navigation and sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab waterway. Iraq also disputes over water development plans by Turkey for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. And Indonesia is in dispute over two islands with Malaysia, who is in dispute with Singapore over two other islands.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

For an in-depth discussion of this process, see Frederic C. Hoff, Refining Full Withdrawal: Remaking the Lebanese-Israeli Border, Middle East Insight, June 2000.
See Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76 War, 1986.
See UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 425 (1978), Document S/2000/460, 22 May, 2000, p. 3.
Ibid.
http:/www.munic.org/pdfs/SC_B.pdf
See Asher Kaufman, Who Owns the Shebaa Farms? Chronicle of a Territorial Dispute, Middle East Journal, vol. 56 # 4, October 2002.
Ibid.
UN Security Council Resolution 350 (1974)
The Daily Star (Beirut), May 9, 2000.
The Daily Star (Beirut), May 29, 2000.
See Beyrouth 1:200,000 Sheet NI36-XII available in the U.S. Library of Congress.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shebaa_Farms
World Net Daily, August 3, 2006.
See Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolutios 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).
http://www.jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/072106/op1_3965102.shtml
Quoted in Nicholas Blanfon, Hizbullah Hoist by Its Own Petand, The Middle East, April 2001
BBC, What Is Hizbullah? http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4314423.htm
Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 1559, 2004.
Aljazeera.net, July 28, 2006.
For a list of the Judgments of the International Court of Justice, visit http:www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/decisions.htm




©Copyright 2006, Gabriel Sawma. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Gabriel Sawma, a lawyer dealing with International Law, mainly the European Union Law, the Middle East Law and Islamic Shari'a law. Professor of Middle East Constitutional Law, Islamic Shari'a, Arabic and Aramaic languages. Expert witness on Islamic marriage contracts, including the mahr; expert witness on U.S.-Middle East commercial contracts. Member of the Beirut Bar Association in Lebanon; The New York State Bar Association; Associate member of the American Bar Association. Author of an upcoming book on "Islamic marriage Contracts in U.S. Courts and the Mahr." Author of an upcoming book on conflicts in U.S. Middle East Commercial Contracts. Editor of International Law website: http://www.gabrielsawma.blogspot.com, Email: gabrielsawma@yahoo.com

Tel. 609-915-2237

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Gabriel Sawma 

The Scope and Nature of Immunity from Jurisdiction for Heads of State under International Law

The immunity of President Bashar Assad of Syria Under International Law.
By Gabriel Sawma, Esq.


The Assassination of Former Prime Minister, Rafiq al-Hariri.

In February 14, 2005 a powerful blast killed the former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafik al-Hariri in Beirut. The US recalled its ambassador to Syria for consultations over the death, which raised fears of a return to the violence of Lebanon’s civil war years.

The United Nations Security Council called for the perpetrators to be brought to justice. The Secretary General Kofi Annan urged more progress on the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. US Ambassador Margaret Scrobey delivered a note to the Syrian government expressing US outrage over the killing.

Mr. Annan said in a statement that he had written to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, to urge him to comply with a UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon.

The United States and France jointly initiated a demand by the Security Council to bring the killers to justice. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced the dispatch of an independent team to investigate the assassination. The mass demonstrations in Lebanon, featuring harsh attacks against Syria, which until then had been unprecedented, encouraged the West to place increased pressure on Damascus to fulfill the terms of Security Council Resolution 1559 and remove its forces from Lebanon. In April 26, 2005, the Syrian government announced the withdrawal of their forces in compliance with the Security Council Resolution.

A probe was established to investigate the killing of Rafiq al-Hariri, headed by a known German prosecutor, Detlev Mehlis. The investigation is still going on at the time of this article. The Question is, what will happen next. If Syria’s President is involved in this criminal activity, does he loose his immunity as Head of State?


Immunity Under International Law

Until the 20th century, there were no international courts which could exercise jurisdiction over heads of state, and national courts could not exercise jurisdiction over serving heads of state or former heads of state for public acts carried out while in office. This position under international law has since evolved.

It developed first under article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) whereby the former Kaiser, William II, was indicted for prosecution before special tribunal to be constituted by the victorious powers. Then came to the trials before the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals at the end of World War II.

Under the UN Charter Article 29, the Security Council has the power to establish subsidiary bodies to perform its functions. The Council could establish a Liaison Group with International Courts that would coordinate with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), international criminal tribunal, two of which were established: the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).

Due to significant financial and personnel requirements, none of the Security members supported the establishment of another UN tribunal similar to the ICTY and ICTR. Instead, the UN decided to create a special hybrid-court that will be administered jointly by the government involved and the United Nations.

Accordingly, the Security Council set up several criminal tribunals, these are:

· Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to look into the crimes committed against civilians with mass amputation and rape. The SCSL is a “hybrid” national and international court designed to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice.
· Special Tribunal for Cambodia (STC) to look into the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge who killed an estimated 1 million people during the 1970s. Thirty years later, the UN and the Cambodian government agreed to establish a joint national and international court to hold those responsible accountable.
· Ad Hoc Court for East Timor to look into the crimes committed by the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias who murdered thousands of Timorese during the territory’s struggle for independence, and hold responsible the perpetrators from the Indonesian government.

The primary difference between the Special Court and the ICTY and ICTR is the mandate under which they are created. The ICTY and ICTR were established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gives the United Nations power to intervene in the affairs of sovereign state to restore international peace and security. These tribunals are under the jurisdiction of the UN and operate independently from and irrespective of the Yugoslav and Rwandan governments.

A treaty between the United Nations and the sovereign governments, usually under joint jurisdiction, created the Special Courts for Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and East Timor, and as such, the tribunals represent an entirely new model for bringing perpetrators or war crimes to justice. These Special Courts are staffed with both local and international judges and prosecutors. The Secretary-General appoints a Chief Prosecutor for each case, while the local governments, in consultation with the UN, appoint a Deputy. Although the Deputy will have some input on the indictments, the Chief Prosecutor will make the final decision.

If security allows, the Special Courts is usually located in the country where the crimes were committed; it is much easier for victims to follow the court’s proceedings. At the same time, diplomats will facilitate the diffusion of legal knowledge from international to local judicial officials, which will assist in rebuilding the country’s judicial system. The Security Council resolution in the case of Sierra Leon explicitly notes the “pressing need for international cooperation to assist in strengthening the judicial system of Sierra Leone.”

The drawback of Special Tribunal is that, because the Security Council directly establishes it, the court cannot assert primacy over the national courts of third states, unless the Council endows the court with the power to request the surrender of suspects in third states. It is important to keep in mind that, with the absence of a Chapter VII mandate will also prevent the court from extending its jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes perpetrated in neighboring country. A UN tribunal established with a Chapter VII mandate might be able to prosecute these crimes.


Prosecution of Heads of state, and high-ranking officials. The immunity issue

The immunity of head of state is one of the most controversial topics in international law. The purpose of the immunities is to offer a complete protection against national criminal jurisdiction. To create an exception to this rule would be to create a possibility of abuse and thereby defeat the purpose of the immunity. This principle has been held recently even with respect to international crimes. In the Pinochet case, the judges emphasized “head of state is till protected while in office by immunity ratione personae even in respect of serious international crimes.” That means a serving head of state or diplomat can still claim immunity if charged with [torture]. “The nature of charge is irrelevant; his immunity is personal and absolute.”

In March 2001, the French Cour de cassation held in the Qaddafi case that the crime charged, i.e. complicity in acts of terrorism, did not fall within the categories of international crimes providing for an exception to immunity from jurisdiction of Heads of State. A serving head of state is immune from prosecution in national courts, even in relation to serious acts of terrorism.

In the case of Fidel Castro, the Spanish Audienco Nacional reached the same conclusion. It stated that the Cuban President could not be tried even for international crimes, as long as he was serving in his capacity as head of state. He enjoys immunity under public international law. The Spanish Court ruled that it has no jurisdiction to try Castro.

In October 2001, the United States Court reached a similar conclusion in Tachiona v. Mugabe. It affirmed that the Torture Victim Protection Act did not override either traditional diplomatic immunities or the comparable immunity given to visiting heads of states. Diplomatic immunity prevents national prosecutors from initiating a lawsuit against foreign head of state or its diplomatic corps regardless of the charge.

Attempts were made by other governments to limit the scope of the immunity to heads of states and other high-ranking officials. In 1999, Belgium passed a law providing universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed by anyone, anywhere, even if the perpetrator was not present in Belgium and denying all immunities for such crimes. On April 11, 2000, a Belgium judge issued an international arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia, who was at the time serving as the minister for foreign affairs for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC initiated proceedings against Belgium in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that the universal jurisdiction in absentia asserted by Belgium exceeded international law and that Belgium’s non-recognition of the immunity of a serving minister of foreign affairs was a violation of international law.

The ICJ issued its ruling on Feb. 14, 2002 by 13 votes to 3 that Belgium had violated a legal obligation towards the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The court firmly rejected the notion that, having regard to the developments in international law and in particular customary international, a serving foreign minister was entitled to claim immunity before a national court. It held that the immunity before national courts was not affected by the existence of treaties such as the Torture Convention. The court held “in that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the DRV enjoyed under international law. It held that the immunities ratione personae enjoyed by a Foreign Minister could not be set aside by a national court by charging them with war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The personal immunity of Heads of State from jurisdiction always covers official visits abroad, private visits are also protected, although to a more limited extent. In an exception to immunity given to high state officials from foreign jurisdiction, the International Court of Justice stated that the immunity seizes if the state they represent waives their immunity.


The Immunity of Head of State Under the Special Tribunals

With the establishment of UN Special Tribunals and a growing body of international human rights law, the international community has strongly asserted individual responsibility for violations of human rights. The status of sitting Head of State appears to be the last battleground on this issue; prime ministers, presidents, and kings are remaining individuals who are granted immunity for the gravest crimes by a system of international law, which refutes impunity for all other individuals. This situation is being reversed gradually.
Sierra Leone suffered through a gruesome, ten-year civil war. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Snakoh, used amputations and mass rape to terrorize the population and gain control of the country’s lucrative diamond mines. Charles Taylor, then president of neighboring Liberia, backed the insurgency providing arms and training to the RUF in exchange for diamonds. In 1999 the UN eventually brokered the Lome Peace Accord between the warring parties.

In January 2002 the UN Security Council approved the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to try those responsible for the crimes committed during the civil war. The purpose of the Special Court was to prosecute those with the “greatest responsibility” for crimes against humanity, the court may decide whether to indict individuals who continually instigate conflict and brutality in their region. On June 4, 2003, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) issued an arrest warrant against Charles Taylor, the incumbent President of Liberia. When the warrant was issued, Mr. Taylor was traveling to Ghana for talks with Liberian rebel groups to end a four-year civil war that has destabilized West Africa. The indictment against Mr. Taylor had been issued on March 7, 2003, but was kept sealed until the Special Court Prosecutor saw in Mr. Taylor’s trip an opportunity to apprehend him. The warrant was served on the authorities of Ghana, and transmitted to Interpol. Ghanaian authorities did not apprehend him.

On May 31, 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in Freetown ruled unanimously that Charles Taylor does not enjoy any immunity from prosecution by the Court though he was the serving Head of State of Liberia at the time criminal proceedings were initiated. This historic ruling by the Court is a significant contribution to the modern international law norm asserting that Heads of State and other high-ranking governmental officials are not absolved of criminal responsibility for serious international crimes.

Despite its hybrid nature, the SCSL is not considered a national court; it acts as an international court, even though it functions on the territory of Sierra Leone. In other words, it is based outside the legal system of Sierra Leone. The State of Sierra Leone transferred the jurisdiction to the SCSL on the basis of an agreement with the UN Security Council. Given the Arrest Warrant case, Sierra Leone courts would have been unable to prosecute Mr. Taylor.

As the SCSL performs its job in Sierra Leone, it is independent from the national judicial system; the prosecutor and judges enjoy diplomatic immunity from any undue influence by its host state on judicial decisions. The fact that Sierra Leone has appointed three judges is negligible as they can always be overruled by a majority opinion of international judges, or in cases of clear prejudice may be disqualified.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which governs ICTR and ICTY, does not back the agreement between the Security Council and Sierra Leone. Both ICTR and ICTY were established by Chapter VII Security Council resolutions, by which all members of the UN were bound by the decision to remove immunity for state officials. Although the SCSL did not have Chapter VII backing, nevertheless, it had the “will” of the international community behind it. The broad support from all sections of the international community for its creation-political and financial-, and that it was set up pursuant to (although not by) a Security Council resolution. It was this unexpressed fact, which gave the SCSL a sufficient degree of comfort to hold that it was an international court before which immunity of a Head of State did not apply. The majority opinion among legal scholars favored the view that there is no entitlement to immunity before international courts, and therefore nothing to be waived.

On June 29, 2001, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under article 18 of the Statute indicted Slobodan Milosevic while he was President of Yugoslavia.

The Statute of Rome, which established the ICC adopted in 1998 article 27, which provides that there was no entitlement to immunity for any person subject to the Jurisdiction of the ICC.


The Iraq Tribunal Trying Saddam Hussein and Other Top Baath Leaders

The capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003 prompted a worldwide debate about how best to try him and other top Baath Party Leaders. On August 11, 2005, the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly approved a war crimes tribunal in Iraq, which was originally established by the US-installed Iraqi government Council. The court is mandated to prosecute numerous high level members of the former Iraqi regime who are accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, but the court has mainly focused on its most high-profile case: Saddam Hussein. Saddam went on trial on October 19, 2005, for a 1982 massacre that took place in Dujail, north of Baghdad.

Human Rights groups and legal experts agree that the Iraqi people must have the right to try their own persecutors, but question the competence and impartiality of Iraq’s judicial system. The Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), run by the US Department of Justice, is actively involved in the court’s investigations, the translation of materials and the training of Iraqi lawyers and judges. Critics believe that by backing a trial in Iraq, Washington hopes that its past support for Saddam Hussein will not be revealed. Opponents of the court had hoped for an internationally organized tribunal with significant domestic participation, similar to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), to avoid the tribunal degenerating into a “political show trial.” An international tribunal would also allow Kuwait and Iran to take part in the trial (as they have requested) for crimes committed against these two countries.


Is the President of Syria Immune From Prosecution Under International Law?

Without commenting on the merits of the case, the assassination of the former Prime Minister al-Hariri of Lebanon by foreign elements from Syria constitutes a violation to international law. Should the President of Syria be implicated in such a terrorist attack, his immunity will be hanging in the air.

The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri in February 2005 led the UN Security Council to issue Resolution 1595 setting up an international commission of inquiry.

On October 31, 2005, the Security Council met at Ministerial Level and formally endorsed the Report of the United Nations Independent Investigation Commission that found evidence of Syrian involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. The Security Council issued Resolution 1636 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It called for Syria to “cooperate fully and unconditionally with the Commission and insisted it not interfere in Lebanese affairs.”

On December 17, 2005, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1644 in which it demanded that Syria respond “unambiguously and immediately” to the Commission investigating the terrorist attack that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and extended the probe initially until June 15, 2006, leaving open the possibility of further extension.

The Council also authorized the Commission, following the request of the Lebanese Government, to extend its technical assistance to that Government with regard to their investigations on the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since October 1, 2004, and caused the murder of prominent journalists including Gibran Tueini, editor in chief of a leading Lebanese newspaper “An Nahar”. It asked the Secretary-General, in consultations with the Commission and the Lebanese Government, “to present recommendations to expand the Commission’s mandate to include investigations of those other attacks.”

The Security Council also acknowledged the Lebanese Government’s request that “those eventually charged with involvement in the terrorist attack be tried by an international tribunal, the Council asked the Secretary-General to help that Government identify the nature and scope of the international assistance needed in that regard, and to report to the Council in a timely manner.”

In a recent TV interview, the former Vice President of Syria, Abdul-Halim Khaddam, who defected to France, said that Assad had threatened Hariri during their last meeting. Syrian President denied the charge, but suggested in an interview that he would not allow UN investigators to interview him about the Hariri’s killing.

Under the current situation, and before the formation of the International Tribunal, the Prosecutor can issue an Arrest Warrant against the president of Syria, but national courts, based on the precedents mentioned earlier, will not agree to that.

However, as soon as the International Special Court is established, the Prosecutor can issue an International Arrest Warrant; upon the approval of the Court, the Interpol will be notified and the Head of State will be considered a fugitive. An arrest warrant is an order issued by the Prosecutor to authorize the arrest and detention of an individual.

Under the rules of the International Criminal Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) will authorize such an arrest warrant, upon an application by the Prosecutor. (An indictment, mostly used in common law countries, is a formal charge against an individual ‘or formal accusation’ for having allegedly committed a serious criminal offense. The ICTY but not the ICC is using the indictment procedure.)

Once the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation, he then may at any time make an application for an arrest warrant Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC). The Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant shall contain the following information (Rome Statute, Art. 58):
· The person’s name and identifying information;
· A specific reference to the alleged crimes and a concise statement of the facts thereof;
· A summary of evidence and information establishing the reasonable grounds for a warrant; and
· The reason why the Prosecutor believes the arrest is needed.

Following receipt of the Prosecutor’s application, the PTC will evaluate the materials presented by the Prosecutor and issue an arrest warrant when the PTC feels that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC; and when the PTC finds it necessary that the person be arrested. Arrest warrant remains in effect until the Court decides otherwise.

The Chamber may decide to keep a decision “sealed”, this means that the decision will be confidential and only accessible to those persons or organs of the ICC (or outside actors), which the Court authorizes.

On the basis of this arrest warrant, the Court may request a State Party to make a provisional or a full arrest and surrender. The Registrar is responsible for transmitting a request for cooperation issued by the Chambers (e.g. a request for arrest) to a State Party or international organization. The Registrar will also be responsible for receiving all responses to the request from the requested State or international organization. However, a Chamber may allocate to the Prosecutor, instead of the Registrar, the responsibility to transmit a particular request for cooperation, or warrant of arrest, and to receive the responses to such requests.


What happens after an arrest warrant and a request for arrest has been issued?

The ICC does not have its own police force. When the Pre-Trial Chamber has issued an arrest warrant, the Court relies on the cooperation of States and international organizations to arrest and surrender the person. Moreover, the Court may, by itself or following a request by the Prosecutor, take certain measures that are necessary to ensure the safety and well being of any victims and witnesses, including measures related to the protection of information.

A State Party receiving a request for cooperation has to keep the request confidential. Any information about the request may only be disclosed if this is necessary for the execution of that request.

Once a person has been arrested and the Court has been informed about the arrest, the Court must hand over the arrest warrant to the arrested person. The arrested person must then be brought before a court in the State Custody, which must determine, based on its national laws, that the right person has been lawfully arrested.


Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

Judicial authorities should be aware of the fact that it may be very difficult to determine the personal responsibility of a Head of State. Indeed, it would be necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he ordered or instigated the perpetration of the crimes charged with, or, despite having the effective power and authority to prevent or punish the persons responsible for the commission of those crimes, willfully failed to do so. So far no Syrian official has been punished in Syria.



©Copyright 2006 Gabriel Sawma Esq. all rights reserved.
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